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Reflections on Voluntary
Compliance Under the Federal
Election Campaign Act
Thomas B. Curtis*
In this article, the author, aformer Chairman of the Federal Election Commis-
sion, speaksfrom experience about the unique challenge of carrying out the Commis-
sion's mandate under the Federal Election Campaign Act: to keep the federal
electionpro cessfair and to restore to it the confidence ofthepeople. He reflects upon
the needfor the FEC, in carrying out its duties, to guard against the abuse of first
amendment rights, especially the right of the citizenry to petition the governmentfor
redress ofgrievances and to be alert topossible abuses of an incumbent's "reporting
back" duty without stfling the legitimate use of thatfunction. In exercising its au-
thority over federal elections, the FEC must remain mindful of the Constitution's
assignment to the states of the dominant role in overseeingpresidential elections; the
author suggests that, because of these constitutional limitations, the concept of volun-
tary compliance should and does prevail in accomplishing the Act's purposes. Fi-
nall, the author notes that the achievement of widespread voluntary compliance
requires a Commission independent of the Congress and the presidency, and pin-
points modfication of the FEC'S role such that it acquires that independence as one
of the most important areas forfurther work in the elections area.
INTRODUCTION
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION of the election process is
a narrow but vital area of jurisprudence. It is suigeneris and
only limited value may be derived from comparing it with other
types of governmental regulation because elections are so different
from all other regulated activities.' Instead, insight into the na-
* A.B. (1932), Dartmouth College; J.D. (1935), Washington University. The author
was Chairman of the Federal Election Commission from 1975 to 1976. He is currently a
partner in the firm of Curtis, Crossen, Hensley, Allen, Curtis and Altman, in Clayton,
Missouri.
The views expressed here are Mr. Curtis' own and do not necessarily reflect the past or
present views of the Federal Election Commission.
1. John R. Bolton, one of the counsel for James Buckley and Eugene McCarthy in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), has enumerated some of the salient differentiating
characteristics:
First and most important, political campaigns have definite endings. Although
campaigning, particularly for the presidency, has become an increasingly lengthy
process, it still ends on election day. Second, no matter how much preparation a
candidate may make, it will not be until the campaign itself that most of the
difficult legal questions concerning campaign financing will arise and need an-
swering. The time consuming style of regulation typical of other federal agencies
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ture of federal regulation of elections must be gained through
analysis of its historic and present function in the democratic
process.
Elections are the prelude or antechamber of representative
government itself and the epilogue or postmortem chamber of its
performances. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) was cre-
ated as an umpire to keep the process fair and to restore to it the
confidence of the people. As the second presidential election of
the Commission's career approaches, it seems appropriate to re-
view election regulation's fundamental role in American politics
and pinpoint the areas where further modification of the Commis-
sion's activities is needed to fulfill that role.
Ensuring the peaceful and fair transference of political power
among individuals in society is one of the most difficult and sensi-
tive functions of any government. It is here that representative
democracy, "the worst form of government except all those other
forms,"2 most clearly proves itself preferable to "those other
forms." The more that good sense and careful judgment are de-
voted to improving the election process, the better this "worst
form of government" becomes.
This paper first considers some of the values to which a federal
regulator of elections must remain sensitive. In the wake of Buck-
ley v. Valeo,3 much has been said about the freedoms of political
speech and association and the federal election laws. Other rights
and traditions, however, have escaped the attention of the federal
judiciary as it has entered the political thicket. Most important
among them is the right of the citizenry to petition the government
for redress of grievances.' Another is the vital American political
tradition that legislative representatives should report back to the
people who elected them. In these areas the FEC confronts an
unresolved tension: "petitioning" and "reporting back" are
deeply at stake when the activities of incumbents are regulated,
yet that is precisely where regulation is most needed.
is thus a luxury that the Federal Election Commission cannot afford except after a
particular campaign has concluded. Third, campaigns are not highly structured
corporate bureaucracies. They often engender spontaneous activity well beyond
the effective control of the candidate or his staff.
Bolton, The Federal Election Commission" Government.4stride the PoliticalProcess, AMERI-
CAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE JouRNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SocIETY, July 1978, at 46.
2. Speech by Winston Churchill, House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), 444 ParL Deb.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 207.
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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In considering the proper role of the FEC, it is important to
review the Constitution's allocation of authority over federal elec-
tions. That the states are assigned the dominant role in presiden-
tial elections has serious implications for federal regulation in this
area. This paper explores the constitutional limits of federal regu-
lation of presidential elections and concludes that, at least in the
area of federal financing for elections to the electoral college, these
bounds have been overstepped.
Partly as a result of these historic and constitutional considera-
tions, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)5 depends heav-
ily on voluntary compliance to effectuate its purposes. The
sanctions of both the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act6
and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act7 ap-
ply only to those who accept federal financial assistance for their
campaigns. My thesis is that a true concept of voluntarism can
prevail in this area of administrative law. At least with regard to
the election laws, an approach based on voluntary compliance is
viable and is working effectively.
Finally, I shall discuss the independence of the FEC-a con-
cept essential to the full realization of voluntary compliance. In
my view, the Commission is not yet sufficiently insulated from the
political pressures that naturally emanate from the Congress and
the executive branch.
I. THE FEC AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT
John R. Bolton has asserted that "the Federal Election Com-
mission is-must be-different from other agencies because it reg-
ulates political speech, not railroad rates."' I disagree with Mr.
Bolton's facile assumption that there can be no regulation of the
election process without impeding constitutionally protected
speech or assembly. To my mind, Buckley v. Valeo made it clear
that the Federal Election Campaign Act neither requires nor al-
lows regulation of protected political speech or activity.9 If Mr.
5. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1976); I.R.C. §§ 9001-42 (1976), as amendedby Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 94-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 1280, as
amended by Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§§ 101(a)-(d), 90 Stat. 475, 476, 481, as amended by Act of Dec. 20, 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-216, § 502(a), 91 Stat. 1565. [The sections of the Internal Revenue Code codified at
Title 26 of the United States Code will hereinafter be cited to that Title.]
6. 26 U.S.C. § 9001-12 (1976).
7. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-42 (1976).
8. Bolton, supra note 1, at 51.
9. See 424 U.S. at 39-59.
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Bolton had said, "If not careful the Federal Election Commission
can easily get into regulating political speech," I would agree.
Then the more relevant question would arise, "Has the Commis-
sion been careful?"
I believe the Commission has thus far exhibited scrupulous re-
gard for first amendment freedoms. But the potential for infringe-
ment remains. The Supreme Court in Buckley struck the
compulsory expenditure limitations from the original Act as un-
constitutional "restrictions on . . . protected political expres-
sion."10 Yet, another first amendment concern is at stake in this
regulatory program. If the Federal Election Commission is not
careful in administering the Act, it can become involved in regu-
lating the right of the people "to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."I1
In my view, this right is second in importance only to the right
to vote itself. In a representative democracy the people must have
free access to governmental officials. Although the first amend-
ment explicitly protects the right to petition government, this right
has thus far received little attention by the courts. Since the right
to petition the government is crucial to a functioning republic, and
since it could be endangered by an overly free-wheeling FEC, I
believe it merits careful consideration.
In a broad sense, the entire election process is an omnibus peti-
tion for redress of a whole collection of grievances, and those en-
gaged in electing are perforce engaged in petitioning. The
techniques employed are similar and intermingled. More specifi-
cally, the right to petition is at stake when government seeks to
regulate the citizenry's communications and activities with incum-
bents running for office. The problem is of considerable dimen-
sion for the FEC because it is constantly dealing with incumbents
seeking reelection. 12
Unfortunately, petitioning government is better known-and
not without justification-by its pejorative names: "lobbying"
when exercised in the legislative branch and "influence peddling"
when exercised in the executive or "independent agency" branch
10. Id. at 58-59.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. In the Congress, incumbents have won over 85% of all congressional elections
since 1954. TwENTiETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FINANCING CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGNS, ELECTING CONGRESS: THE FINANCIAL DILEMMA 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as ELECTING CONGRESS.] Rarely does a one-term President decline to run for a second
term.
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
of government. These labels bespeak the ability of incumbents to
convert the right of the people to petition government into a
means of securing votes. In my view, Members of Congress over-
reach when they attempt to handle too many constituents' peti-
tions on an individual basis. By acting selectively on particular
grievances, a legislator can grant special favors with the expecta-
tion of receiving a returned favor, often financial, during the cam-
paign for reelection. This is, of course, a corruption of the
governmental process when it is not properly handled.
The biggest, most influential lobbyists in Washington are gov-
ernmental officials in the executive and regulatory agencies. Ac-
cordingly, in pursuing their right to petition the Congress, the
people have often found it efficacious to work indirectly through
the executive branch. With the power of the President to com-
mand the attention of the people'when he speaks--"the bully pul-
pit" as Theodore Roosevelt accurately described itl 3 -the
executive branch can be effective in both petitioning the Congress
and influencing the reelection of its Members. Moreover, the way
that the executive and the agencies use their broad, discretionary
powers is of vital interest to Members of Congress acting in their
representative capacities-and in their desires to be reelected.
The executive branch can grant or withhold federal contracts or
appointments. It can determine where to locate federal facilities
and Which laws to enforce vigorously and which to ignore. In
promulgating regulations the agencies can determine how fully (or
meagerly) to flesh out a statute. All these can be wielded by the
executive branch and the agencies as redeemable political favors
to influence the reelection of favored incumbents in Congress.
I believe that an incumbent Member of Congress should be
reelected for work well done as a legislator, not on the basis of
reciprocated favors. A distinction must be drawn between peti-
tioning a Congressman legitimately in his representative capacity
and improperly influencing a Congressman as an incumbent de-
siring reelection. A really thorough program of election regula-
tion would prevent abuse of the right to petition the government.
Unfortunately, the existing laws are woefully ineffective. Sec-
tion 1913 of the federal criminal code, 4 for instance, makes it ille-
13. See Putnam, Roosevelt: Historian and Statesman, in T. ROOSEVELT, 9 WoRKs OF
THEODORE ROOSEVELT X (national ed. 1924).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1976). This section provides that:
No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall, in the
absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay
[Vol. 29:830
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gal for federal funds to be used to subsidize lobbying. By
ensuring an arm's length executive-congressional relationship, en-
forcement of section 1913 could prevent the use of the executive
branch as a vehicle for incumbent Congressmen improperly seek-
ing to please selected, influential, wealthy constituents. Yet, the
Justice Department has ignored section 1913 since its enactment, 15
and for years Presidents have openly established lobbying offices
in the White House euphemistically called "Congressional Liai-
son."16 Such uses of federal funds by the executive are obvious
violations of section 1913.
The recently-enacted limitations on outside compensation for
Congressmen 17 and controls on campaign financing are important
first steps. But much more needs to be done to prevent incum-
bents, who happen also to be candidates, from acting on the citi-
zens' petitions with a diligence related only to a particular
constituent's ability to help secure the incumbent's reelection. I
believe the petitioning process itself could be formalized without
unduly impeding it. Codes of ethics have been established for
Congress as a whole, but special codes should be established for
the powerful congressional committees who ultimately act on the
people's petitions when they are formulated as proposed legisla-
tion. Such codes should also prescribe ethical procedures to guide
the actions of House-Senate conferences where differences be-
for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or
written matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a
Member of Congress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or
appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the introduction of any bill or
resolution proposing such legislation or appropriation: but this shall not prevent
officers or employees of the United States or of its departments or agencies from
communicating to Members of Congress on the request of any Member or to
Congress, through the proper official channels, requests for legislation or appro-
priations which they deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the public busi-
ness.
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any depart-
ment or agency thereof, violates or attempts to violate this section, shall be fined
not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and after
notice and hearing by the superior officer vested with the power of removing him,
shall be removed from office or employment.
Id.
15. One of the few courts to confront this statute observed: "Unfortunately, in section
1913 plaintiffs have dusted off a statute which because of its obscurity may render impossi-
ble a precise judgment concerning the intent of Congress in passing the legislation. There
appears to be no record of prosecutions under the statute." Naional Ass'n for Community
Dev. v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D.D.C. 1973).
16. See generally L.B. JoHNtSON, Congress and the Presidency, in LEGISLAIVE PoLrr-
ics U.S.A. (T. Lowi & R. Ripley ed. 1973).
17. 2 U.S.C. § 441i (1976), as amended by Act of December 20, 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-216, § 502(a), 91 Stat. 1565.
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tween two versions of legislation on the same subject are recon-
ciled. Much needs to be done to insure that these forums are fair.
The adversary method of fact finding and decisionmaking should
prevail, as it does in the courts, by forbidding exparte, in camera
presentations. Opening these committee forums to all persons
would inhibit the improper trading of favors between self-inter-
ested incumbents and powerful lobbyists.
It is possible that such a broad scheme of election regulation
could infringe upon the constitutionally protected right to petition
the government by unduly impeding the people's access to elected
officials. Nevertheless, the FEC remains subject to the discipline
of the judiciary as a guardian of first amendment rights,' 8 and the
Congress, in the exercise of its broad oversight powers over the
FEC, 19 provides an additional safeguard. And of course the peo-
ple, acting through Congress, could modify the functions of the
FEC by legislation if it should unduly restrict their right to peti-
tion their representatives.
II. THE REPORTING-BACK FUNCTION
A significant characteristic of representative democracy is the
vital function of legislators to report back to the electorate about
governmental developments. Effective democratic government re-
quires an informed citizenry, and Members of Congress have at
their disposal numerous means of communicating with constitu-
ents. The franking privilege, for instance, allows postage-free
mailings,20 and Congressmen have liberal stationery accounts.
The Senate and House both have extensive television and radio
recording facilities available to Members free of charge. There
are also two well-staffed offices for each Member, one in Washing-
ton and the other at home.
Again, the preeminence of incumbent candidates in federal
elections presents a dilemma for the FEC. All the perquisites of
office do have legitimate functions and, if it is not careful, the
Commission could get into unduly regulating what I shall call the
"reporting-back-to-the-people" function of representatives. But at
the same time, incumbents should not be afforded unlimited free
play with the perquisites of office in seeking reelection. Since
18. See 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1976) (providing expedited judicial review and standing to
"any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President" in cases involv-
ing the constitutionality of provisions of the FECA).
19. Id. § 437c(b)(2) (1976).
20. 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1976).
[Vol 29:830
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
much of a representative's reporting back involves activity that
very closely resembles campaigning, the two are not always easy
to distinguish. I used to refer to my own campaigns for reelection
to the House simply as "concentrated periods of reporting back
under heckling."
Difficult as it is to distinguish proper use of congressional per-
quisites for legitimate reporting-back purposes from misuse for
campaign purposes, Congress has begun to draw the line. De-
tailed statutes limit the use of the frank to official, proper pur-
poses.21 The Senate has sought to limit incumbents' use of the
congressional radio and television studios during periods preceed-
ing elections.22
Yet, much work remains. Almost a decade ago the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Financing Congressional Cam-
paigns recommended "that a federal election commission enforce
rules that will prevent members of Congress from using their staff,
office, and communications facilities to plan and run their reelec-
tion campaigns."'  For the most part, this plea has fallen on deaf
ears. The FEC has never been given specific authority to prevent
abuse of the advantages afforded incumbents through their report-
ing-back duties. The election statutes require only that the monies
and services in kind used to influence or elect be reported to the
FEC. If the FEC insists on full and timely reporting, the ensu-
ing publicity might eliminate much of the abuse. The problem,
however, is that the use of congressional perquisites to get re-
elected-particularly the use of congressional staff-remains un-
reported.25
The size of the personal staffs of House Members has in-
creased from four in 1950 to eighteen in 1979. This is disturbing
because no Member of Congress needs eighteen persons to carry
out his reporting-back duties. There was considerable merit in ar-
guing for larger staffs for the increasingly busy congressional com-
mittees where the bulk of the legislative research, drafting, and
oversight work is done. But in the case of individual Members,
the expanded staffs have concentrated on nonlegislative, nonrep-
resentative functions. A large personal staff provides valuable
21. Id.
22. See S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S 5397 (1977).
23. ELECTING CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 26.
24. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(11) (1976).
25. For a discussion of misuse of congressional staff for campaign purposes, see
ELECTING CONGRESS, supra note 12, at 25-26.
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public relations services free of charge to the incumbent, which a
challenger would have to pay for out of campaign funds. Con-
gressional offices have sometimes served as campaign headquar-
ters,16 and, as the election date approaches, the efforts of the
eighteen-person staff shift easily from the routine ombudsman
work of acting on constituents' petitions and reporting back to the
citizenry to full-fledged campaign work for the congressional em-
ployer. Clearly these people should leave the federal payroll
while performing campaign duties and be paid by the campaign
organization. And although this work constitutes service in kind
rendered for a candidate, little of it is disclosed to the FEC.
Thus, while the FEC must respect the legitimate reporting-
back functions of incumbents in Congress, currently there is con-
siderable abuse of the perquisites provided to facilitate the per-
formance of that function. The most the FEC can do is to insist
on full disclosure of such activities. And this alone would actually
further the purpose underlying the reporting-back function to en-
sure an informed citizenry.
Before considering controls on the reporting-back activities of
the President, it is necessary to recall some important distinctions
between the process of electing a federal executive and the process
of electing federal legislators. Just as the Constitution prescribes
different purposes for the executive and legislative branches, it
prescribes entirely separate election procedures for the two types
of office. These distinctions bear crucially on the proper extent of
the President's reporting-back function and, indeed, on the extent
to which the FEC can be empowered to regulate elections to the
respective offices.
Because of the nature of his election and his office, the federal
executive, unlike his congressional counterparts, does not have a
responsibility to report directly back to the people.2 7 There is con-
siderable misunderstanding of this point. To a large degree the
confusion is the result of the recent popularity of the doctrine now
identified pejoratively as the "Imperial Presidency."28 The presi-
26. See, e.g., Election Unit to Extend Morton Investigation to Others, N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1976, at 34, col. 5.
27. The President does, however, have a responsibility to report to the people's repre-
sentatives in Congress. "He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the
State of the Union and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient .. " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
28. I use the phrase "Imperial Presidency" to connote the notion that the President
should formulate substantive policy instead of executing the laws enacted by Congress.
See M. BURNS, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENt. THE CRUCIBLE OF LEADERSHIP (1965).
Vol. 29:830
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dency also provides a "bully pulpit," as our first Imperial Presi-
dent, Theodore Roosevelt, described it,29 to harangue the people,
and in a message to Congress the President can really address the
people over the heads of their true representatives in Congress.
This is particularly true since the arrival of the national news wire
services, radio, and television. Together, the doctrine of the Impe-
rial Presidency and the "bully pulpit" create the mistaken impres-
sion that the President should report directly to the people.
The doctrine of the Imperial Presidency is based upon two fal-
lacies. The first is that the federal executive is a "super-legislator"
and the sole leader, not merely one of the leaders, of his political
party. This myth encompasses the idea that it is the responsibility
of the President personally to lead the people and the Congress in
political action, as is truly the case with prime ministers of parlia-
mentary governments such as those of Great Britain and Canada.
The second fallacy is that the President of the United States is
elected directly by the people as congressional representatives are.
Despite all of the public relations camouflage, this is not so. As a
matter of fact, in some states the citizen does not even cast his vote
for a presidential candidate; he votes for an elector pledged to one
of the political parties.30 Even where the citizen does vote directly
for a presidential candidate, invariably all of the names on the
ballot have already been selected by delegates to political conven-
tions.31
Today's method of electing the President has evolved from the
original constitutional plan, but the basic framework of 1789 re-
mains strong. Any national scheme of election regulation must
proceed within that framework. It is helpful in understanding this
constitutional structure to view it as consisting of three tiers.
The first tier is the selection every fourth November by the
people in each state of electors for the electoral college.32 Actu-
ally, the original system has evolved so that the national conven-
tions at which each party's presidential and vice-presidential
The phrase gained currency, of course, in A. SCHLESINoER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973).
29. See Putnam, supra note 13.
30. See W. SAYRE & J. PARRIS, VOTING FOR PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
AND THE AMERICAN POLrrIcAL SYSTEM 41 (1970).
31. Id.
32. The Constitution prescribes the first tier procedures as follows: "Each State shall
appoint as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Con-
gress.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § I, cL 2.
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candidates are chosen constitute, in practical effect, additional
"electoral colleges." At the second tier, the groups of electors
meet in their respective states and formally cast their votes for one
of the political parties' presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates. The candidate with the most electoral votes in each state is
given all of that state's electors--the "winner take all" system.
Then, the official results of each state's electoral poll are transmit-
ted to the President of the Senate (the incumbent Vice President)
in Washington.33 Only if no candidate gets a majority of the vote
in the electoral college does the third tier procedure for choosing
the President and Vice President go into operation. There, the
power to choose among the three top candidates in the electoral
college is vested in the Congress. 34
At most, the chosen President should have a responsibility to
report back only to the constituencies that actually chose him,
namely, to the delegates of the political party whose national con-
vention nominated him and the electors of each state. Because the
people are not the President's electoral base, he has no duty to
report directly back to them. When he does engage in reporting-
back activities, it is not in a genuinely representative capacity.
Rather, it can only be a self-serving effort to convince the people
of the efficacy of his policies or, in election years, to influence his
reelection.
But, as I shall develop presently, it is questionable whether the
federal government--Congress, the President, or the Supreme
Court-has any constitutional authority over the first two tiers of
33. The twelfth amendment sets out the second tier procedures:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President
and Vice-President. . .; they shall name in their ballots the person[s] voted for as
President and... Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President and. . . Vice-President, and of the number of votes for
each, which they shall sign and certify and transmit sealed to the seat of the gov-
ernment of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
34. At the third tier
The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be President,
if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if
no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers
not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Repre-
sentatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President .... The person
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed,
and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list,
the Senate shall choose the Vice-President.
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the three-tier process for selecting the federal executive.35 Thus,
the FEC's powers to regulate or interfere with whatever reporting-
back function the President assumes is negligible. Indeed, as a
practical matter, because it enjoys first amendment protection, the
news media-the critical link in all presidential communications
with the people-has more effective power to regulate or select
what gets through to the President's constituents than has any
agency of the government. 36 The result is that the FEC is virtu-
ally powerless to control or regulate any reporting-back-to-the-
people function that an incumbent President may assume, even
when he does so solely to enhance his prospects for reelection.
An instance from the 1976 presidential election campaign il-
lustrates the special problems the FEC has in dealing with an in-
cumbent President. In January, 1976, President Ford publicly
announced he was placing a former chairman of the Republican
National Committee on his staff in the White House as "Coun-
selor to the President."37 This new aide, however, would also
have responsibilities for working with President Ford's reelection
committee.38 As a Commissioner, I stated that this was treading
on thin ice. Treating this aide as a White House advisor rather
than as a campaign employee would enable the President to avoid
charging the aide's salary against the expenditure ceiling.39 The
FEC's dilemma here was that it had no authority to prevent the
President from putting people on the White House payroll and
then assigning them to go out and organize his campaign for re-
election. The most the Commission could do was to insist on full
reporting of these campaign expenses and then charge them
against the President's expenditure ceiling. Fortunately, the at-
tendant publicity, at least in this instance, led to full compliance
on the part of the candidate.4°
35. See text accompanying notes 49-64 infra.
36. At least with respect to the politically important broadcast media, however, Con-
gress has assumed a substantial regulatory role because of the limited number of national
airwave frequencies available. Thus, under the equal time provisions of the Federal Com-
munications Act, Congress has sought to assure candidates fair access to broadcasting facil-
ities. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
37. Postfor Morton Draws Criticism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, at 17, col 1.
38. Id.; N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1976, at 34, coL 5.
39. See 26 U.S.C. § 9035(a) (1976).
40. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1976, at 34, coL 6.
Later, candidate Ford's incumbency presented further difficulties. When the Republi-
can National Committee accepted federal funds to hold its national convention, it was
bound to spend these funds impartially among candidates seeking the Republican nomina-
tion. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9004(a), 9008(c). It could not show any preference for any single
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In summary, then, the FEC must seek a balance in regulating
incumbents' campaign activities. With regard to the Congress, the
Commission must respect the traditional responsibility of legisla-
tors to report back to the people they represent. At the same time,
however, the Commission should strive to prevent incumbent
Congressmen from converting the perquisites of their reporting-
back duties into campaign tools. The President has no real report-
ing-back function. Nevertheless, since the ascendancy of the no-
tion of the Imperial Presidency, Presidents as a matter of course
have delivered their messages directly to the people. Because, as I
shall explain, the FEC's authority does not extend to the relation-
ship between the President and his constituents, whatever report-
ing-back the President does is largely beyond the ambit of the
FEC.
III. FEDERALISM AND THE FEC
In Buckley v. Valeo,a4 the Supreme Court held that the
mandatory expenditure ceilings of the original Act offended polit-
ical and associational freedoms guaranteed by the first amend-
ment.4" I believe that coercive federal controls over presidential
elections would suffer another infirmity. They would violate the
constitutional allocation of authority over the electoral college
and national political conventions.
The Constitution vests the basic power over federal elections,
both presidential and congressional, in the states, with certain pre-
emptive rights in the Congress with respect only to congressional
elections. Section 4 of article I provides that: "The Times, Places
and Manner of Holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Reg-
ulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. '43
Potentially, national authority over congressional elections is
plenary, except for the states' choice of a place for senatorial elec-
tions. Thus, at least with respect to elections to the House of Rep-
contender over another. Time and again, the Republican National Committee demon-
strated its misunderstanding of this principle. Repeatedly, the National Committee openly
treated the President's supporters more favorably than his challengers. In seeking to justify
its actions favoring the incumbent candidate, the National Committee's attitude was simply
that things had always been done that way.
41. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42. Id. at 37-59.
43. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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resentatives, the federal government could conduct congressional
elections separately from elections to state and local offices. Nev-
ertheless, Congress has historically preferred to rely on the states
to organize and operate the machinery of all political elections.4"
Federal candidates, in effect, ride piggyback on the ballot with
those running for local office. Congress has never exercised its
constitutional choice to preempt state authority "by law," except
to set a common date for holding national elections.45 Its actions
under these clauses have been merely additive rather than pre-
emptive.
Elsewhere in the Constitution, Congress is given considerable
latitude concerning congressional elections. The Framers granted
Congress the exclusive power to "judge" the results of elections of
its Members: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members. ... I Congress
has been vigorous over the years in exercising this power. There
have been, I would estimate, about a score of election disputes
filed with the House of Representatives and turned over to the
House Administration Committee at the beginning of each new
Congress for the last fifty years.47
Federal authority over the election of the President and the
Vice President, in contrast to that concerning congressional elec-
tions, is sharply limited. The power over the first tier of this com-
plicated process48 is vested exclusively in the states.
The Constitution provides that "Each State shall appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors. . .. ,,49 Here, no preemptive rights are vested in Con-
gress. This language makes it clear that Congress has power
44. See generally A. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINurrY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYsTEM 39-45 (1971); W. SAYRE & J. PARRIS, supra
note 30, at 64.
45. See 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 5, cl. 1.
47. One can only estimate the number of congressional election disputes because of
the spotty records kept by the House Administration Committee, which has had jurisdic-
tion over such matters since the nineteenth century. The Congressional Record mentions
only those cases which reach a relatively high point of development, so it, too, is of little
help. For numerous synopses ofpre-1934 cases of disputed congressional elections, see C.
CANNON, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1934); A. HINDS, PRECE-
DENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1907).
Of course Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-47 (1969) contains a lengthy discus-
sion of Congress' power to judge the qualfcations of its Members-elect.
48. See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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neither to conduct nor to regulate the initial tier in the selection of
the President and Vice President, that is, the elections to the fed-
eral electoral college. Authority over these elections is given en-
tirely to each state as the legislature thereof may direct. Congress
may determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on
which they shall give their votes, "which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States,"' 50 but this is the extent of its power
at this stage. Not until the second tier-the transmission to the
Senate of the "lists of all persons voted for as President, and...
as Vice-President" 51 by each state's group of electors-does fed-
eral authority become involved. Thus, with the exception of mat-
ters relating to the right to vote, presidential elections have always
been administered and regulated entirely under local authority.52
Congressional treatment of the Constitution's silences con-
cerning the procedure for presidential elections confirms the tradi-
tion of state control. Unlike the case with disputed congressional
elections, there is no provision in the Constitution stating who
should judge disputes about electoral votes after each state's elec-
tors send their "lists" to Washington at the second tier of the proc-
ess.53 When faced with the disputed Hayes-Tilden electoral
returns in 1876, Congress created a special electoral Commis-
sion.54 This Commission ultimately accepted the returns as certi-
fied by recognized state authority, declining to reexamine the state
certification. The result was codified, 6 and today Congress will
regard any state law resolution of a controversy concerning the
appointment of presidential electors as conclusive.5 1
The Constitution was also silent on how a new President
should be chosen in the event both the President and Vice Presi-
dent die in office. Congress often sought to cover this gap by stat-
ute.58  Eventually, however, the twentieth and twenty-fifth
amendments were ratified, giving Congress explicit power to legis-
50. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
51. Id. amend. XII.
52. See A. BIcKEL, supra note 44, at 39-45; W. SAYRE & J. PARRIS, supra note 30, at
67, 87.
53. See note 33 supra.
54. Act of Jan. 19, 1877, ch. 37, § 2, 19 Stat. 227.
55. D. MALONE & B. RAUCH, CRISIS OF THE UNION 336-38 (1960).
56. Electoral Count Act of 1887, ch. 90, § 2, 24 Stat. 373 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 5
(1976)).
57. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
58. Eg., Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 65; Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat.




late in the area.59 That constitutional amendments ultimately
were deemed appropriate suggests that the earlier statutory solu-
tions stood on shaky ground and affirms the paucity of congres-
sional authority over the means of selecting Presidents.
Furthermore, as every student of American history knows, po-
litical parties were not provided for in the Constitution. The polit-
ical parties developed in the nongovernmental sector of society
and they remain to this day essentially private organizations.6 °
Any governmental regulation over political parties has historically
been exercised at the state, not the federal, level.61 Indeed, the
major parties are charged with much of the responsibility for con-
ducting the elections.62 Private individuals and the states have al-
ways determined the procedures to be used for selecting delegates
for national political conventions. 3
What these constitutional and historical considerations mean
for the current election laws is plain. In my view, it is doubtful
whether the federal government-which would be the Congress if
any branch at all-has any power to interfere with or regulate the
electoral college or national conventions. Thus, the constitution-
ality of the federal election laws which provide federal financing
for the first tier of the presidential election process is highly ques-
tionable. To the extent that the federal election laws intrude coer-
cively into this historical domain of the states, they offend the
principles of federalism underlying the Constitution's allocation
of authority over national elections.64 It is for this reason that the
FEC must rely so heavily on voluntary compliance, rather than
governmental compulsion, to effectuate its purposes.
IV. VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
A spirit of voluntarism pervades both the title 2 reporting pro-
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4, amend. XXV, § 4. See also 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1976); 3
U.S.C.A. § 19 (Supp. 1979).
60. For a discussion of the local, private nature of political parties, see Ripon Soe'y v.
National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 574-89 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
61. See P. ODEGARD & E. HELMS, AMERICAN POLMCS: A STUDY IN POLrmCAL Dy-
NAMICS 671-79 (1938); Starr, TheLcga1Status ofAmercan Parties, 34 AMERiCAN POL. Sci.
REV. 439, 685-88 (1940).
62. See C. RossrrER, PARTUs AND POLITICS IN AMmUCA 40-42 (1960).
63. See Ripon Soe'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 & n.63 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
64. In 1976, the FEC failed to mention this limitation of federal power in its annual
report to Congress. I attempted to alert Congress to the constitutional question in a state-
ment of dissent. Dissenting views of Commissioner Curtis to the FEC Report to the Con-
gress on Selection of Delegates to the National Party Conventions (on file with the FEC).
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visions and the title 26 funding provisions. Under the latter, it is
optional for presidential candidates and political parties to accept
federal financial assistance. The sanctions set out in the statutes
depend entirely upon contractual relationships between recipients
of funds and the United States. To receive assistance for presi-
dential primary campaigns, candidates essentially enter into con-
tracts in which they "certify" under the threat of perjury sanctions
that they will abide by the expense and contribution limitations65
and "agree" to furnish the FEC with their records and to submit
to an FEC audit.66 Similar stipulations accompany the receipt of
funding for the campaigns preceding the November election.67
In light of the constitutional considerations discussed earlier,68
it is hard to see what the Congress can do other than rely upon
voluntary, contractual agreements in seeking to regulate the first
tier in the process of selecting a President and Vice President. I
have some doubt whether Congress can indeed contract to achieve
results over which it has not been given jurisdiction under the
Constitution.
In any event, it seems rather clear that a candidate or political
party disinclined to use federal funds is unaffected by the title 26
provisions. Submission to regulation under them, therefore, is
voluntary.
The title 2 reporting requirements also reach those first tier
electoral activities that are beyond the federal sphere. To the ex-
tent that they are coercive, their viability-again, in light of the
Constitution's allocation of authority over elections-is open to
question. Fortunately for the sake of constitutional principles of
federalism, effectuation of the title 2 provisions rests, as a practical
matter, almost entirely on voluntary compliance, rather than fed-
eral compulsion.
Although the title 2 provisions authorize the Commission to
initiate civil actions to enforce the Act,69 the FECA specifically
directs the Commission "to encourage voluntary compliance. 70
Moreover, the Commission must "make every endeavor for a pe-
riod of not less than 30 days to correct or prevent [any apparent]
65. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9033(b)(1), (4) (1976).
66. Id. § 9033(a)(2), (3) (1976).
67. Id. §§ 9003(a), (b)(1), (2) (1976). The expenses of political parties accepting fed-
eral funding for their national conventions "may not" exceed statutory limitations. Id.
§§ 9008(d)(1), (2) (1976). Significantly, the language is permissive, not mandatory.
68. See text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
69. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(6) (1976).
70. Id. § 437d(a)(10) (1976).
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violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion, and to enter into a conciliation agreement with the
person involved .... ,7 1 During the first year of its operation, the
FEC established a policy of making every effort to eschew com-
pulsion.72 In my opinion it is only this overriding spirit of volun-
tarism that can justify federal regulation of those historically local
aspects of presidential elections.
In that light, it is necessary to deal with the contention of some
commentators that there really is no such thing as voluntary com-
pliance with an administrative agency's directives. An unfortu-
nate attitude which might be described as neo-Machiavellian
pervades the literature. Consider, for example, the views of Pro-
fessor Kenneth Culp Davis. He takes such a cynical view of vol-
untary compliance in all its manifestations that he refers to it as
"coerced consent. ' 73
It is important to set out Professor Davis' viewpoint rather
fully because it illustrates a widely held, derisive attitude toward
administrative law. There is no gainsaying that some of what Pro-
fessor Davis has to say is regrettably accurate, but if his point of
view is basically sound, then indeed there is no such thing as vol-
untary compliance.
The supervisory power is the power of an administrative
agency to coerce a regulated party by methods other than adju-
dication or rule making. It is a concomitant of, an outgrowth
from, and a substitute for the prosecuting power. In some of
the most effective regulatory agencies, perhaps nine tenths or
more of the desired results are produced through exertion of
the supervisory power.
From the standpoint of the overall system, the supervisory
power is much in need of attention .... The power to prose-
cute or to withhold prosecution is frequently the power to co-
erce substantive action. Agencies wield this power to coerce
... often without procedural safeguards and usually without
any opportunity for check through judicial review.
The fact that stipulations and consent orders are based
upon consent does not mean that parties are necessarily pro-
tected against exercise of arbitrary power. Oft-repeated charges
that the [Federal Trade] Commission [, for example,] makes
oppressive use of the stipulation procedure by inducing inno-
71. Id. § 437g(a)(5)(A) (1976).
72. The Commission resolved early in its career to use the civil enforcement action
"only when absolutely necessary." [1975] FEC ANN. REp. 58. Throughout my tenure as a
Commissioner, there was no occasion to resort to the civil enforcement action.
73. K. DAvis, ADmINIsTRATI LAW TExr § 4.06 (1959).
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cent respondents to admit illegality in order to avoid the ex-
pense and publicity of a formal proceeding apparently have
never been systematically investigated. But the Commission's
long-term refusal to accept stipulations in any case unless the
respondent admits the facts the Commission alleges has long
been adversely criticized.
A dissenting Commissioner recently dubbed the resulting
system "regulation by lifted eyebrow."
Much administrative action rests upon the kind of consent
which bars the regulated party from effective remedy. Yet that
consent is often coerced ...
In all such cases the regulated party consents and therefore
cannot complain. But to argue that consent should bar further
protest is not the same as concluding that justice is necessarily
done. On the contrary, the opportunity for arbitrary action is
extraordinary, for the decisive determination leads to exertion
of pressure through the threat of instituting formal proceedings,
and that determination is largely unprotected by procedural
safeguards.74
I do not subscribe to Professor Davis' thesis that the viability
of agency action rests solely upon agency threats to institute en-
forcement actions. On the contrary, administrative law-and not
just the administrative law of the FEC-can be grounded upon a
true concept of voluntarism.
The Commission believed that most participants in the politi-
cal process were genuinely desirous of complying with the law."
That, perhaps, is where my viewpoint differs most from that of
Professor Davis. As I see it, the relationship between a regulatory
agency and the regulated parties, contrary to Professor Davis' as-
sumption, need not be antagonistic. In creating the agencies, Con-
gress often seeks to avoid the antagonistic approach to the
maximum extent possible and to gain the compliance of the citi-
zenry without compulsion. After all, every regulated producer (or
candidate) is also a consumer (or voter); we are all indirect benefi-
ciaries of sound regulatory programs. Even those subject to a reg-
ulatory scheme might benefit from it:- witness the motorist who,
forgetting traffic regulations, narrowly misses a pedestrian, then
parks his car and is nearly struck as he crosses the street.
If we can accept administrative law as a fourth kind of legal
74. Id. § 4.01-.03, .06. Professor Davis set forth a similar observation in the latest
edition of this work. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.09 (1972).
75. See [1975] FEC ANN. REP. 30.
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process-the judicial, executive, and legislative processes consti-
tuting the. first three-then, I would submit, there is yet a fifth
process. This is the noncompulsory or voluntary process. This
fifth process, the voluntary process, has always been a part of
every society. Religion and economics, for example, have long
been strong motivating institutions in society, but their influence
on behavior is not compulsory. Consider also "custom and us-
age": voluntary, consensual relationships and practices may recur
so frequently that over time they become the expected norm, the
custom and usage of the field. At some stage customs and usages
might assume a compulsory dimension; commercial law, for in-
stance, is substantially founded on established custom and usage.
But in the beginning the underlying practices and relationships
are voluntary, and governmental compulsion is unnecessary to as-
sure compliance with society's expectations.
So it should be with administrative law. The federal election
laws fit this model well. Title 2 is essentially a disclosure statute.
Its theory is that opening political campaigns to public scrutiny
will induce voluntary conformity with the societal expectations ex-
pressed in the substantive measures of the Act.
A review of the Commission's activities suggests how thor-
oughly the voluntary compliance concept permeates its adminis-
tration of the FECA. The goal of voluntary compliance
determined the priorities and organization of the FEC from the
outset. The idea was that candidates wanted to comply with the
law and would comply if they were properly advised of their legal
responsibilities. Accordingly, the Commission regarded the devel-
opment of programs to educate and advise candidates as its key
initial task.76 Prior to the 1976 election, the Commission con-
ducted seminars for political committees across the country.77
Numerous publications were prepared to explain the law in lay-
man's terms.78 The FEC Record was established to disseminate
the Commission's policy decisions. The Commission sent letters
explaining the law to each candidate in the 1976 elections7 9 and
drafted a great number of advisory opinions. FEC field auditors
and advisors met with committee staffs and candidates to explain
reporting, accounting, and auditing procedures and to establish
working, on-the-spot relationships with campaign managers and
76. Id.
77. Id. at 56.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 39.
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staff.80 A toll-free line was established for telephone inquiries.8"
To effectuate the purpose of the reporting provisions of title 2, all
campaign reports received were made readily available for public
inspection at the FEC's "store-front" Public Records Office.82 It is
this heightened public awareness of candidates' financial activi-
ties-and not merely the threat of an enforcement action--that
encourages voluntary compliance with the contribution limita-
tions and, for those accepting funding under title 26, the expendi-
ture ceilings.
The topic of voluntary compliance arose frequently during the
FEC's early years. In late 1975 and early 1976, just as the Com-
mission was establishing itself, it conducted several audits of can-
didates and political parties during the New Hampshire special
senatorial election. Later these activities were challenged by Wil-
liam Cramer, the general counsel of the Republican National
Committee, who inquired under what authority the Commission
sent its people to New Hampshire and interposed in the election."
I responded that the Commission acted under no authority at all
in the sense and tone the question was asked, but only to carry out
the concept of voluntary compliance. There is no reason the par-
ticipants cannot sit down with the umpire ahead of-and even
during-the contest to agree upon fair and reasonable ground
rules which the umpire will apply across the board.
On many occasions I expressed to the Commission and the
staff my hope that the staff would not put on Uncle Sam suits, sit
in Washington, and dare the people to violate the election laws as
they might be interpreted in the dark recesses of the FEC offices.
Nevertheless, the funding provisions could well press the Com-
mission to draw some difficult lines. In May, 1975, Robert
Strauss, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee,
challenged the Commission "not to tell us how many balloons we
can order for our national convention." I responded with the
hope that the Commission would not get into such matters. Yet I
had to point out that a future Commission impressed that it was
handing out taxpayers' dollars might well undertake a thorough
determination of what constitutes "expenses incurred with respect
to a presidential nominating convention."83 This is because "pay-
ments [to candidates or parties] shall be used only" to defray such
80. Id. at 40-41.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Id. at 48.
83. See 26 U.S.C. § 9008(c)(1) (1976).
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expenses.8 4 If the public funds turned over to candidates or par-
ties are used for any purpose other than to defray qualified cam-
paign expenses, the Commission may seek reimbursement. 85
In all, I believe that the election laws' scheme of voluntary
compliance is working. In my view, there are ultimately only two
sanctions the FEC needs in order to bring about compliance with
the election laws. Neither of them interferes with the voluntary
compliance approach or robs it of its meaning by creating a situa-
tion of "coerced consent." These sanctions are criminal perjury for
false statements86 and criminal contempt for failing to file timely
statements. 87 Both are relatively simple and well established stat-
utory crimes. The FEC can refer these matters to the Justice De-
partment for prosecution and be fairly confident that action will
be taken. The Congress thoughtfully provided for the Attorney
General to make periodic reports on his actions "until there is
final disposition"8 8 of such a charge.
V. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COMMISSION
The most serious impediment to the success of voluntary com-
pliance is the Commission's lack of independence. The achieve-
ment of widespread voluntary compliance requires a Commission
in whose motivations and decisions regulated parties can have
faith. Credibility is crucial, and the key to a credible FEC is inde-
pendence from even the appearance of political influence.
The most difficult problems facing the Commission revolve
around its relations with the Congress and the President. Unless
the Commission is sufficiently insulated against routine political
pressures from those currently in office in either branch, the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act can become, as many critics already
have alleged, the "Incumbents' Protection Act."89 Independence
is thus imperative if the Commission is to act with integrity. Un-
fortunately, as things now stand, the Commission is bound too
closely to the will of both the Congress and the executive.
The Commission's considerable dependence on congressional
favor is practically assured by the requirement that all of its pro-
posed regulations be submitted to Congress for the potential veto
84. Id.
85. Id. §§ 9007(b), 9008(h).
86. See id. §§ 9012(d)(1), 9042(c)(1) (1976).
87. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12) (1976).
88. Id. § 437g(b) (1976).
89. See, eg., Bolton, supra note 1, at 46.
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of either House.9 0 Properly used, this formalization of Congress'
oversight responsibilities would serve a valuable purpose in keep-
ing the FEC within the limits of its statutory authority. I believe
that Congress usually acts with justification when it seeks to stem
the recent tendencies of agencies to go beyond-the parameters of
the statutes Congress has written. But, unfortunately, the scope of
the veto over the FEC's proposed regulations is not limited to ul-
tra vires provisions. Twice the Congress has misused the veto
procedure as a subterfuge merely to express disagreement with the
substance of an FEC policy. By vetoing the Commission's first
two regulations both the Senate and the House made it clear that
the veto would be exercised simply because one House or the
other disagreed with the judgment of the FEC-even though it
was rendered within the scope of its statutory powers.91 Then, in
the 1976 amendments, the Congress underscored the general sub-
servience of the FEC by adding new language to the Federal Elec-
tion Act: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit, restrict,
or diminish any investigatory, informational, oversight, supervi-
sory, or disciplinary authority or function of the Congress or any
committee of the Congress with respect to elections for Federal
office."92
The Commission's dependence upon congressional favor is
further illustrated by the fact that the FEC must continually come
before the Congress for authorization legislation-as well as for
annual appropriations.93 It is significant that the 1974 statute gave
the FEC existence of less than a year.94 Its first reauthorization
request was for a lifetime of only 18 months, yet it was never en-
acted. Currently, the FEC has a three-year appropriation but no
authorization.9 If it is to be independent of the immediate politi-
cal pressures of the Congress the FEC must have a permanent
authorization or, at the minimum, an authorization of five years.
Happily, the appropriation process in the statutes does permit the
FEC to present its budget requests directly to the Congress rather
90. 2 U.S.C. § 438(c) (1976).
91. See S. Res. 275, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 32321 (1975); H.R. Res.
780, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 33674 (1975).
92. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101,
90 Stat. 475 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(2) (1976)).
93. 2 U.S.C. § 439c (1976).
94. Federal Election Campaign Act § 210, 88 Stat. 1289 (1974) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 439c (1976)).
95. 2 U.S.C. § 439c (1976).
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than the Office of Management and Budget.96 Thus, the Commis-
sion is free from direct financial dependence on the pleasure of the
executive branch.
Still there is ample opportunity for incumbents in Congress to
snuff out FEC regulations which might have the effect of limiting
incumbents' preelection activities. Both Houses are run through
standing committees whose membership is selected under the un-
written, but rarely overlooked, seniority rule. Accordingly, the
real power structure is in the hands of long-time incumbents who
are continually running for reelection. 7 Thus the regulator must
answer to the regulated.
In short, as experience shows, the Congress can and will undo
anything the FEC does that the Congress does not like. This cer-
tainly is the very opposite of creating a Commission which is in-
dependent of routine political pressures. It seems to me that
vigorous public hearings on the FEC's Annual Reports to the
Congress and the President would ensure sufficiently close con-
gressional oversight without threatening the Commission's inde-
pendence.
As a Commissioner, I often urged that the FEC formalize its
relations with the Congress so that it could retain as much inde-
pendence as possible.98 As early as May, 1975, I suggested that we
channel all of our communications with the Congress through the
Chairman's office both for the sake of efficiency and to be certain
that our relations were proper. This met with indifferent response.
It still merits emphasis that section 1913 of title 28 broadly
prohibits the use of federal money in communications with Mem-
bers of Congress except with "express authorization by Congress"
or "through the proper official channels." 99 Even if this section
were not in the Code, it would be wise for the relationship be-
tween the Congress and the FEC to be as much at arm's length as
possible. There is no reason for the FEC to deal with the Con-
gress other than through the official channels set out in the FECA.
Thus, communications should be strictly limited to appropriation
requests, °° the required reports containing recommendations for
96. Id. § 437d(d)(1) (1976).
97. This power is concentrated particularly in the House Administration Committee,
and a Subcommittee of the House Appropriation Committee, the Senate Rules and Ad-
ministration Committee, and a Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriation Committee.
98. E.g., Memorandum from Commissioner Curtis to Commissioners (Nov. 3, 1976)
(on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review).
99. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1976), see note 14 supra.
100. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d)(1) (1976).
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legislative or other action,' 10 advisory opinions written at the re-
quest of individuals holding federal office,'0 2 and the procedure
spelled out for sending proposed regulations to the Congress.10 3
Of course, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House,
as nonvoting members of the Commission, provide routine, more
casual channels. But maintaining a healthy, formal distance be-
tween the Commission and the Congress will surely promote the
Commission's independence.
A most unfortunate development concerning the composition
of the FEC as it bears on its independence is the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckley v. Valeo. 1°4 Concentrating the power to ap-
point the Commissioners in the hands of the President is a serious
step backward from the innovative concept in the original law,
which provided for a tripartite appointing authority--two Com-
missioners by the Senate, two by the House, and two by the Presi-
dent. An important purpose of the law, as even the Buckley
opinion perceived, was to restore the confidence of the people in
the American political system. 105 Thus, it was crucial to split
whatever influence, real or imagined, might be gained from the
power of appointment. Now, as a result of the Buckley decision,
the possibility of self-aggrandizement by incumbent Presidents
looms larger. Very conceivably, an executive could pack the
Commission with loyal favorites.
In addition, the six-year term of the Commissioners' ° is prob-
ably too short to allay the pressures that could be applied by in-
cumbent Commissioners seeking reappointment. The FECA does
permit the Commission to elect its Chairman. 07 This is a step
toward independence; in some regulatory bodies the President
chooses his own Chairman.' However, the current practice of
rotating the FEC Chairmanship and limiting it to a one-year
term'0 9 tends to weaken this advantage.
The Act keeps the criminal enforcement power in the hands of
the Justice Department despite that Department's deplorable rec-
101. Id. §§ 437d(d)(2), 437e (1976).
102. Id. § 437f(a) (1976).
103. Id. § 438(c) (1976).
104. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
105. Id. at 25-27.
106. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(A) (1976).
107. Id. § 437c(a)(5) (1976).
108. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976) (Federal Trade Commission); 47 U.S.C. § 155
(1976) (Federal Communications Commission).
109. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(5) (1976).,
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ord in enforcing violations of the federal election laws going back
to the Corrupt Practices Act of 1909.110 Too easily the President
can apply pressure on the Justice Department for his own benefit
or for the benefit of incumbent Congressmen in hopes of getting
reciprocal favors. This underscores the danger of vesting the en-
tire appointive power in the President, as is necessary after Buck-
ley. Fortunately, the Justice Department is required to submit
reports to the FEC about its progress on any matter the Commis-
sion refers to it. II This exposure should discourage foot-dragging
in the executive branch.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FECA brings campaign activity into the light of public
scrutiny. That alone should further the integrity of the American
political process. The watchful eye of the people naturally en-
courages voluntary compliance. Since, as I believe, most partici-
pants in the political process really do want to follow the law, the
concept of voluntary compliance is eminently suitable for election
regulation.
The desirability-indeed the necessity-for voluntary compli-
ance in the area of federal elections is rooted in the character of
the American democratic process. The right of the citizenry to
petition the government for redress of grievances (along with
other first amendment freedoms), the traditional .duty of congres-
sional representatives to report back to the people, the constitu-
tional limitations on the proper sphere of coercive federal
elections activity, and the fundamental importance of voluntary
compliance to the entire scheme of the Commission's existence re-
quire that every effort be made to see that voluntary compliance
works. At the same time, these considerations raise important
challenges for those who seek to further the goal of voluntary
compliance: There must be a greater effort toward insuring that
incumbents do not use the perquisites of their reporting-back
function to get reelected, and toward insuring that the Commis-
sion becomes truly insulated from potential political influences of
incumbents in the Congress and the presidency.
110. See Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First 4mendment, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 900, 905-06 (1971).
111. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(b) (1976).
